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Abstract—Industrial production plants traditionally include
sensors for monitoring or documenting processes, and actuators
for enabling corrective actions in cases of misconfigurations,
failures, or dangerous events. With the advent of the IoT,
embedded controllers link these ‘things’ to local networks that
often are of low power wireless kind, and are interconnected via
gateways to some cloud from the global Internet. Inter-networked
sensors and actuators in the industrial IoT form a critical
subsystem while frequently operating under harsh conditions.
It is currently under debate how to approach inter-networking
of critical industrial components in a safe and secure manner.
In this paper, we analyze the potentials of ICN for providing a
secure and robust networking solution for constrained controllers
in industrial safety systems. We showcase hazardous gas sensing
in widespread industrial environments, such as refineries, and
compare with IP-based approaches such as CoAP and MQTT.
Our findings indicate that the content-centric security model, as
well as enhanced DoS resistance are important arguments for
deploying Information Centric Networking in a safety-critical
industrial IoT. Evaluation of the crypto efforts on the RIOT
operating system for content security reveal its feasibility for
common deployment scenarios.
Index Terms—DoS resilience, unprotected channel, robust
communication,
I. INTRODUCTION
Things in the Internet of Things (IoT) are often represented
by small embedded controllers which possess orders of mag-
nitude less resources (kBytes of memory, MHz CPU speed,
mW of power) than regular Internet nodes, but still need to
communicate using protocols that interoperate in a common
infrastructure. One predominant deployment area is industrial
automation and surveillance, since embedded controllers are
already prevalent in this industry, and adding a networking
layer can generate immediate cost and performance benefits
for its users. Initial deployments rely on legacy protocols
such as MQTT—convergence on a future common networking
standard for the industrial IoT is still under debate.
Today’s things are sensors or actuators that speak with
a remote cloud or talk with each other locally. The preva-
lent communication for edge devices happens on wireless
channels that are from low power lossy networks (LLNs)
in the battery-powered world. Following the IEEE 802.15.4,
BLE, or LWPAN standard, these nodes can exchange only
small packets at very low rates and sleep frequently. Violating
these constraints quickly leads to successive overload, extreme
packet losses, and may strongly degrade network operation and
node availability. Repeated incidents have shown that the mass
of IoT nodes can be both highly threatened and a threat to the
global Internet.
Information Centric Networking (ICN) [1] was introduced
as a networking paradigm for improved content access in a
Future Internet. Ubiquitous caching is a core feature of ICN.
NDN (or CCN) [2], its most popular flavor, was designed
from a strong security perspective as a pure request-response
scheme. It became apparent [3]–[6] that ICN exhibits great
potential for the IoT. The access of named content instead of
distant nodes does not only allow for a much leaner and more
robust implementation of a network layer, but in particular
the request-response pattern of NDN prevents overloading the
receiver with data.
ICN deployment in the IoT has been studied with increasing
intensity [4], [7]–[9], touching various design aspects and
practical use cases. Several implementations have become
available in common IoT operating systems. CCN-Lite runs
on RIOT [4], [10] and on Contiki [11], NDN has been ported
to RIOT [12]. Thus, grounds are prepared for opening the floor
to real-world IoT applications with NDN.
In this paper, we discuss central security aspects of NDN
using the example of an industrial safety system. We in-
troduce a real-world use case which we implemented in a
recent prototype and identify key security requirements in
Section II. The fundamental security contributions of the ICN
networking layer are derived in Section III. Section IV is
dedicated to comparative analyses of NDN versus traditional
IP-based approaches. We further show by measurements that
the underlying crypto-complexity can be well handled by
constrained IoT nodes. A summary and an outlook conclude
this paper in Section V.
II. USE CASE: SECURITY AND SAFETY IN HAZARDOUS
INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENTS
Industrial safety and control systems are increasingly in-
terconnected to interchange operational conditions locally and
to report their status updates to external observers. A typical
deployment scenario consists of IoT stub networks that are
often wireless and confined to the production plant, together
with gateways that uplink to an Internet service provider.
2Current initial deployment scenarios further involve a (private)
cloud which a dedicated group of trustees can access. Typical
stakeholders are the operators of the systems. All parties rely
on secure communication channels established between the
network endpoints and the cloud. This scenario builds closed
data silos for a preselected, confined group. It is visualized in
Figure 1a.
Already today it becomes apparent that the number of stake-
holders in emerging scenarios will widen—plant operators,
emergency teams, equipment vendors, and supervisory author-
ities may retrieve information about current safety conditions,
intermediate operational statistics, as well as long-term reports.
Furthermore, even a wider public may legitimately require
civil participation in affairs of common impact, as is develop-
ing from many open urban sensing initiatives [13], as well as
participatory European laws. Following this demand, data silos
need to break up in favour of a flexible, distributed data access
that cannot easily rely on preconfigured trusted channels. Still,
data might not be uniformly public, but continue to require
protection. Protecting the data itself instead of the transmission
channels paves the way to transparent data replication and
caching—an efficient method for eliding today’s silos. This
heterogeneous environment built from several independent
stakeholders is visualized in Figure 1b.
Industrial deployments often operate under harsh conditions.
In our use case, we consider industrial environments with a
threat of hazardous contaminant (e.g., explosive gas) that need
continuous monitoring by stationary, as well as mobile sensors.
In case of an emergency, immediate actions are required such
as issuing local alarms, activating protective shut-downs (e.g.,
closing valves, halting pumps), initiating a remote recording
for first responders and forensic purposes, and eventually may
need to trigger evacuations of the plant or even the region.
Such complex settings obviously involve many parties and
require a level of robustness which a single uplink to a remote
cloud cannot guarantee.
This use case specifically relies on a fast sensor-actuator
network including embedded IoT nodes. The harsh industrial
environment raises the challenges of mobile, intermittently
connected end nodes, network partitioning, and enhanced
reliability from safety requirements. Devices often need to
connect spontaneously, and a corresponding IoT system cannot
reliably establish end-to-end channels in many situations.
Varying connectivity challenges and mobility, as well as
external hazardous impacts are much easier mitigated in a
replicative environment, where data diffuses hop-wise in an
asynchronous fashion. It is easy to build such a compliant
networking layer based on NDN primitives [14].
Typical industrial plants are widespread with sparse net-
work coverage, so that mobile workers or machines face
intermittent connectivity at scattered gateways. Some sensors
and actuators are infrastructure bound, others are independent,
battery-powered embedded devices (e.g., body equipment).
Such devices are susceptible to battery drains and can process
only a few packets per minute on average. They are easily
challenged by various distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks. Hence networking approaches should minimize the
DDoS surface and protect the embedded edge components.
Taken from real-world deployment, this study makes the
case for a distributed, multi-stakeholder environment and
identifies three major objectives for the networking layer:
1) Allow for ubiquitous multiparty data access without
pre-established secure data channels or VPNs in the
constrained IoT.
2) Provide a robustly secure networking infrastructure that
is resilient to varying link conditions and mobility with
the ability to recover locally from intermittent impair-
ments.
3) Raise the barriers for DDoS attacks of constrained
devices and confine the attack surface of unwanted traffic
to local links.
We will show in the following, how the NDN approaches
to Information Centric Networking can significantly contribute
to these goals. We will also assess the shortcomings of current
IoT solutions such as MQTT [15] and CoAP [16].
III. SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS OF NDN
According to our use case, an industrial IoT deployment
enhances requirements in the security and safety domain, but
on the other hand narrows the utilization of ICN functions
down to rather specific settings. In this section, we will discuss
the three security aspects derived from our use case and
identify certain benefits for NDN from its specific deployment
in an industrial setting.
A. Ubiquitous data access in the constrained IoT
Sensor data need to be accessible both in the local con-
strained IoT, and in the remote for various stakeholders. Safety
and security of the industrial monitoring system indeed largely
depend on its availability even under the harsh conditions
of local or regional incidents with intermittent connectivity.
As critical industrial facilities are always also susceptible
to malicious threats, utmost resilience against (networked)
attacks is strongly desirable. Clearly, a centralized cloud-based
approach falls short as tampering the cloud has proven to be
a pronounced attack vector (cf. the Cloudflare attack 2013).
Ubiquitous caching is the most striking contribution ICN
makes to the security and safety of the distributed information
system. Configuring the constrained nodes as well as the
gateway to replicate and store IoT data for (most of) its life-
time will maximize redundancy and minimize unavailability of
critical information. It is noteworthy that common IoT data is
small and of limited lifetime—archives being a well-localized
exception. Furthermore, flash storage in constrained nodes is
the least scarce resource and typically can accommodate an
‘infinite’ amount of IoT data.
Local mass storage facilitates the DTN nature of ICN for
the IoT. The hop-by-hop transmission of sensor readings and
actuator commands increases resilience in the presence of
caching. When links re-establish after mobility handovers or
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(b) Upcoming IoT deployment: Multiple stakeholders share content
based on in-network caching in ICN.
Fig. 1: Current and future deployment scenarios of the industrial Internet.
failures, the NDN network layer can easily resume the content
propagation and will thus provide an efficient self-healing
mechanism.
B. Robustly secure networking infrastructure
Sensors and actuators of the constrained IoT are typically
challenged by maintaining an authenticated or even encrypted
data channel to some remote data repository. In addition,
unstable and lossy links in IoT edge networks make it hard
to persist a stateful communication relation. Also for these
reasons, IoT nodes are commonly deployed behind gateways
that execute protocol translations (e.g., DTLS versus TLS) and
thereby intercept secured channels. This sacrifices end-to-end
transport security and exposes a significant attack surface at
the gateway.
By authenticating or encrypting content instead of channels
NDN circumvents these operational challenges of the IoT.
As each content chunk can be hopwise replicated throughout
the network without impairing its security measures, data
integrity and confidentiality remain independent of transport
or paths. Moreover, there is no requirement of performing
synchronous actions between specific endpoints on the Internet
which makes the security layer robust against link failures and
network disconnects.
C. DDoS resistance
Constrained nodes on the low power lossy wireless are easy
victims of resource exhaustion when receiving too many IP
packets. A gateway may commonly shield the IoT nodes from
the global Internet and may even perform some (general) rate
limiting, but it cannot reasonably track individual resources of
nodes nor hinder the communication needs of the application
use case. In addition, a malicious member of the IoT stub
domain may not only jam radio channels, but utilize IP
multihop forwarding to overload remote nodes. Conversely,
as has been recently reported from the MIRAI incident, huge
multiplicities make IoT nodes an interesting amplification tool
for attackers.
A key design objective of ICN had been the reduction of this
IP attack surface with respect to distributed denial of service
attacks. In NDN this led to designing a request-response
communication scheme without node addresses that hinders
the plain transmission of unwanted content to a receiver. For
a few years, it was the believe that NDN can be DDoS
resistant by design, until Interest- and state-based attacks were
discovered [17]. Subsequent work [18], [19] elaborated the
threats of Interest flooding and overloading FIB and PIT
structures by user-generated names and content requests. This
has proven difficult to mitigate in general [20]. However,
in a specific industrial setting of pure machine-to-machine
communication with well known traffic patterns, buffers and
PIT tables can be pre-configured according to well-formed
communication flows. Hence, Interest flooding can be detected
at the first hop and eliminated by the receiving stack (e.g., by
hitting PIT limits). State-based attacks can thus be restricted
to the local link which can never be protected by a network
layer.
IV. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
We are now ready to a qualitative security comparison
of our ICN solution with the common IP-based protocols
MQTT and CoAP. We also evaluate the complexity of content
object security that is inherent to ICN, but for a quantitative
performance analysis we refer to [21].
4A. MQTT
MQTT is a message-based publish subscribe protocol, with
a special focus on low bandwidth environments. A typical
MQTT network involves a client that publishes data on a
specific topic. Each topic is managed by a server (or broker)
which distributes data about the topic to subscribers. By
default, a message that has been published and distributed
to the consumers by the broker is deleted after delivery.
Different QoS levels allow for storing messages on the broker
or advanced reliability on top of the transport protocol.
Low-end IoT devices are challenged by basic MQTT, as
MQTT communicates over TCP. A lightweight version of
MQTT is provided by MQTT for Sensor Networks (MQTT-
SN) [22]. MQTT-SN is tailored to wireless domains and op-
timized for devices that are constrained in energy, processing,
or storage. It is implemented on top of UDP and replaces topic
strings by topic IDs to shorten messages.
In MQTT as well as MQTT-SN, security features depend on
the broker implementation. Using username and password, or
alternatively a client certificate, the broker may authenticate
the client it connects to. If TLS (or DTLS) is used, the
client may also authenticate the server. However, there is no
end-to-end security support between publisher and subscriber.
This threatens message integrity when the broker changes
content, because subscribers do not have an out of the box
mechanism to verify the content. To protect the payload,
additional encryption efforts of application data are required
on top of MQTT.
In general, MQTT assumes a trust relationship between
broker, publishers, and subscribers. Usually, authentication and
authorization is ignored completely, to simplify device man-
agement. This trust assumption reflects current deployment
models, in which either brokers and clients are under the same
administrative control, or where service contracts between end
devices and a cloud network with broker service exist.
B. CoAP
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is standard-
ized in the IETF with the aim for replacing HTTP in con-
strained deployment scenarios. CoAP operates on top of UDP
and defines a compact protocol header. It specifies three com-
munication schemes: (i) polling, (ii) push, and (iii) observe.
Using push and observe, CoAP implements publish subscribe
scenarios. In contrast to push, observe does not require explicit
subscription in advance but delivers data to clients based on
pre-configuration at the server side.
To enable M2M communication, CoAP implementations
usually provide both client and server capabilities. Thus,
without an explicit intermediary node such as a broker in
MQTT, CoAP nodes may interact directly with each other.
The security support in CoAP is more advanced compared
to MQTT, even though several specifications are still under
discussion in the IETF. CoAP is secured on the transport
layer using DTLS or alternatively on the application layer
TABLE I: Comparison of MQTT, CoAP, and ICN with respect
to security measures.
MQTT CoAP ICN
Ubiquitous caching ✘ (✓) ✓
Object security ✘ (✓) ✓
Name privacy ✘ (✓) (✓)
Infrastructure protection (✓) ✘ (✓)
End node protection ✘ ✘ ✓
using specific extensions such as OSCoAP, which allows for
object security in CoAP. However, it is worth noting that DTLS
might conflict with constrained environments as packet sizes
increase. On the other hand, current approaches for object
security may conflict with privacy as not all CoAP headers
are encrypted and, for example, may reveal content names.
C. Comparing MQTT, CoAP, and ICN
Caching: Caching does not only improve performance in
terms of faster data delivery but also increases data availability
and robustness. A common malicious scenario includes a
denial of service attack. With proper replication, the origin
data source can go offline without loosing data in the global
network. MQTT is easily threatened by this kind of attack
because of the dedicated broker service. CoAP inherently sup-
ports caching on intermediary nodes. However, this mitigation
is only implemented on the application layer. In common
single stakeholder scenarios, where CoAP servers are managed
by a single administrative domain, this usually does not help,
in particular when network providers are under attack. ICN
provides ubiquitous in-network caching that is independent
of individual stakeholders. Thus, attacking a specific content
source is intricate.
Reliability: IoT nodes connected via low-power wireless
networks suffer severely from lossy communication channels.
Even the transmission of small data chunks to the gateway is
frequently impaired by unstable links, and transport protocols
are challenged to cope with the unstable environment in a
reliable fashion. We compare NDN, confirmable and non-
confirmable CoAP (c/n), and MQTT (Q0/Q1) in Figure 2.
The success rate of packet delivery was measured in two
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Fig. 2: Resilience of NDN vs. CoAP vs. MQTT.
5large experiments of 50 nodes from the FIT IoT testbed
at different publishing intervals. Low power lossy radios of
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard were deployed with link-layer
retransmissions set to four. Results clearly demonstrate the
superior reliability of the hop-by-hop approach of NDN, while
even the reliable variants of CoAP (c) and MQTT (Q1) fail
significantly by 30 % resp. 15 % in the tighter scenario of
publishing every 5 s. NDN always delivers more than 95 %
of the packets, the success rate approaching 99.9 % in the
more relaxed publishing at 30 s.
Object security: Security of content objects is crucial in
inter-domain scenarios, in particular in the industrial Internet
where sensors communicate sensitive information or actuators
interact with critical infrastructure components based on data.
Ideally, content can be forwarded by any node in the network
without sacrificing security. MQTT and CoAP need additional
efforts to achieve this objective. ICN, on the other hand, has
been designed with democratized content distribution in mind.
In-network caching is not limited to specific service nodes but
envisioned to run on any network node that is willing to share
resources for caching. Consequently, content security is a first
principle in ICN, allowing multi-stakeholder scenarios with
respect to scalable and secure content distribution. In ICN,
trust is not based on contracts but technically provided by
design.
Infrastructure protection: CoAP runs on top of UDP. As
UDP is a connection-less protocol without congestion control,
it can easily operate IP packet bursts and spoofing. Having IP
spoofing in place, an attacker can initiate a reflective amplifica-
tion attack, in which the attacker sends a small request towards
the CoAP server that replies with a significantly larger packet
to the victim (i.e., the spoofed IP address). Amplification
attacks are common in the current Internet and a major threat
for operators. With increased deployment of CoAP, we will
experience more of such attacks in the future.
MQTT makes spoofing attacks much more challenging
because of TCP. However, in MQTT-SN, TCP is replaced by
UDP to reduce overhead on low-end IoT devices and thus
opens up the identical attack surface. On the contrary, ICN
abandons the end-to-end paradigm completely and provides
de-localized services off the shelf.
End node protection: End nodes are not protected in MQTT
and CoAP but may receive arbitrary amounts of unwanted
data. Security extensions may enable authentication and au-
thorization but protection against unsolicited traffic requires
firewall extensions, either as infrastructure middleboxes, or as
dedicated local software component running on the end node.
The latter conflicts with constrained resources of low-end IoT
devices. An industrial Internet benefits from ICN as ICN does
not support end-to-end communication. It thus protects end
devices against malicious traffic without additional overhead.
Name privacy: To comply with privacy requirements, ob-
fuscating the requested content name in the content delivery in-
frastructure is important. Implementing this with low overhead
and strong privacy protection is one of the most challenging
tasks in content delivery scenarios, yet. Neither MQTT, nor
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Fig. 3: Computational efforts for signing and verifying data
with HMAC(SHA-256) on typical IoT nodes.
CoAP, nor ICN provide a solution out of the box until now.
The hope here is that the ICN community will introduce a
sufficient solution in the long-term because naming is a key
component, which affects all applications on top of an ICN
network layer.
D. Expenses of content security in ICN
The advantages of content object security in ICN comes at
the price of signing resp. verifying every content chunk that
traverses the network. In CCN/NDN, content signatures are
usually generated from lightweight crypto hashes. In detail,
each content chunk is hashed by SHA-256 followed by a
keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC). This mes-
sage authentication is provided with our RIOT [23] version of
CCN-lite, and we evaluated its performance in benchmarks on
common IoT nodes. Figure 3 displays the runtime performance
as a function of content size for three different IoT boards
(running ARM Cortex M0, M3, and M4). Strikingly, the
cost of few milliseconds per chunk is fully compliant with
networking at the constrained nodes, which can send or receive
a few packets per second at most. Limitations may derive from
energy constraints, though. However, it is safe to conclude that
signing and verifying of content is largely compliant to the
constrained IoT.
HMAC runs with a pre-established secret, which in an
automated environment requires a key management scheme.
We devised a key distribution mechanism using identity-
based cryptography that operates on elliptic curves. In detail,
we implemented the twisted Edwards Curve 25519 in the
Relic library on RIOT and compared with an existing short
Weierstrass ECC on the Cortex M4 board running at 168 MHz.
Figure 4 shows the runtime results for signature generation
and verification of the key establishment that needs to be per-
formed only once. Clearly, these asymmetric crypto operations
are very expensive on our weak microcontroller with runtimes
in the order of minutes. However, they are feasible and enable
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Fig. 4: Performance of identity-based elliptic curve crypto-
graphy on a PhyNode.
powerful schemes for autoconfiguration and self-management.
Alternative schemes of lower complexity also exist.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The industrial IoT connects safety critical environments to
the Internet, requiring a high level of reliability and security for
data, infrastructure, and end devices. Multiple stakeholders in
this inter-domain communication challenge security, but cur-
rent protocols in the IoT are weak in meeting these demands.
In this paper, we start from a real-world use case and derive
a security perspective for an information-centric industrial
Internet of Things. We argue three observations. First, data
should be secured intrinsically, with respect to integrity and
secrecy so that it can be transparently distributed and stored
by any node in the network. Second, low-end devices as
deployed in the IoT should be secured from unsolicited traffic
to preserve resources such as battery power and processing.
Third, the delivery infrastructure requires dedicated protection
to increase data availability. ICN, which abandons the end-
to-end paradigm and provides in-network caching, overcomes
common attack vectors in the current Internet.
In future work, real-world deployment and experimentation
is needed to evaluate and harden the contributions ICN can
make towards a safe and secure industrial Internet of Things.
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